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For the last fifteen years of military rule (1976 -1991) the
Somali people longed for the return to democratic rule.
Unfortunately, they failed to establish nation-wide
organizations that could develop the appropriate strategy to
make the fanshen feasible. Instead, opportunist elements of the
elite organized clanist networks and militias to fight the
regime.
These sectarian clicks refused to cooperate with one another and
each pursued a tribalist agenda. The emergence of sectarian
entrepreneurs reinforced the regime’s own divide and punish
strategy. Others who were aware of the dangers of such a duo
were too inert and risk averse to take up the challenge.
As the regime pursued its scourged earth policy against select
communities and the absence of an alternative civic movement,
people mistakenly sought refuge in clanist associations. Once
the regime collapsed so did the nationalist order. The leaders
of the organized sectarian opposition were in no mood to give up
their sovereignty over “tribal fiefdoms” in order to
re-establish national government.
Furthermore, the civil war turned nasty as the faction leaders,
particularly within groups in the south, fought for supremacy
and ruined whatever little economic, political and cultural
infrastructure the old order left behind. The only partial
exception to this mindlessness has been the northwest of the
country where the public rejected naked intra-communal violence
as the vehicle for political primacy.
Despite the absence of undisguised terror in the latter region,
armed intimidation is never far from the surface. Elsewhere
violence continues to be the only instrument of political
discourse and warlords have been its masters.
Warlord rule means personal and total appropriation of public
power and assets, and the use of private militias to control the
population. This system has turned the population into hostages
since 1992 and, as a consequence, the quality of life has
declined drastically.
For instance, fewer than eight percent of school aged children
receive some kind of instruction compared to nearly 40 percent
in the mid-1980s. Moreover, life expectancy has declined by as
much as 9 years since the early 1990s due to the destruction of
the public health infrastructure, hunger and violence.
Essentially, the merchants of violence have turned the southern
region of the country and particularly the old capital city into
a huge concentration camp.
The international community, led by the USA, attempted to
restore peace and public authority in the early 1990s but that
effort ended in disarray. Three factors led to this failure.
First, the operation’s mandate was unspecified.
Second, the militias in Mogadishu, which was the operational
center of the intervention, were not disarmed and that gave the
faction leaders enough opportunity to do mischief. Finally, the
international community accepted the notion that this was a
tribal civil war rather than a struggle among factions over
power and resources.
The combination of these factors led to the withdrawal of
international troops from Somalia and initiated a new phase of
the civil war. There were only two warlords in Mogadishu at the
time of the UN departure, but their numbers have proliferated
since, and consequently the city and the region have been
Balkanized into warlord Bantustans.
II. The IGAD Process: “Empowered the Warlords and Enfeebled the
Civics.”
The world turned away from Somalia and the population was left
at the mercy of the warlords. Numerous attempts were made to
strike a compromise among the warlords in order to form a
national government but they failed to terminate the chaos. Each
and every reconciliation conference was subverted by several
unhappy warlords who could not achieve everything they lusted
for and who were instructed to do so by their Ethiopian
overlord.
The government of Djibouti, pained by the abominable predicament
of the population endeavored to take a stab at Somali
reconciliation and invited delegates from various communities to
take part in the Arta conference. Many Somalis responded but
most warlords refused to join in as they demanded to have a veto
power over the selection of delegates. In spite of Arta’s
shortcomings, such as the use of genealogical groups as
political units, the conferees agreed to a draft constitution,
selected members of a transitional parliament, and appointed a
president and cabinet.
Most Somalis were relieved that, at long last, a consensus has
emerged and hoped for the appointed leadership to deepen
reconciliation and fully discharge the responsibilities
enunciated in the charter. Their wish, as in so many other
instance came to naught. Five factors perverted the promise of
revival.
First, the appointed leaders failed to grasp the significance of
the moment, the fleeting nature and contingent support of the
public, and gave precedence to self-enrichment and personal
rule.
Second, the donor community was skeptical from the start and
refused to give the TNG the diplomatic and material support
necessary to sustain it until it gained the ability to restore
order and collect taxes.
Third, the regime in Addis Ababa, which was envious because its
warlord clients could not gerrymander events in Arta argued that
the peace process was still incomplete as it was not inclusive
and that senior members of the new government had links to
Islamic terrorists. Consequently, it provided military and
diplomatic support for a number of warlords to form the SRRC,
who opposed the TNG.
Fourth, Mogadishu-based warlords refused to join the government
and work for the stabilization of the Banadir region. Finally,
the absence of a purposively organized national civic movement
meant that the public watched from the sidelines as the promise
of Arta pulverized. Such combination of forces orphaned the TNG
and dashed the people’s hope.
As the TNG floundered, the Ethiopian regime intensified its
subversive efforts and finally convinced the IGAD states and
donors of the need to “complete” the Arta process. Consequently,
another reconciliation conference was held in Kenya in which the
so-called International Partners sanctioned a process completely
dominated by warlords.
A few individuals within the donor camp were horrified by the
prospects of a world engaged in a global war on terrorism
midwifing and chaperoning a government of warlords.
The outcome of the torturously long process was the triumph of
Ethiopia and its clients warlords. In spite of the distaste the
public had for the odious “peace process” they reluctantly
accepted its outcome with the faint hope that the warlords cum
government would lead.
Unfortunately, it took only a few months before the new masters
of Somalia demonstrated that they were only interested in
sustaining the rule of the armed men rather than restoring the
rule of law. Further, some of the key figure of the TFG openly
revealed their devotion to their Ethiopian handlers rather than
to the Somali people.
Nearly a year and one half has lapsed since its inception and no
progress has been made except the never ending attempts to
reconcile the warlords within the government. Thus, the people’s
business languishes. In the meantime, members of the
international community continue to utter their vacuous
expression that they are ready to help Somalia once Somalis come
to a serious agreement.
The pertinent question for the internationals is which Somalis
they have in mind: the hostage or the jail keepers (warlords)
whom they brought to power?
III. Warlords are Terrorists
A bit over two month ago the warlords in and around Mogadishu
formed what they called the Alliance against terrorism and
restoration of peace. Their declared objectives were to root out
a foreign terrorist cell which they claim to be in the city and
the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu that supposedly harbor them.
They also allege that they have been encouraged and financed by
a major power and members of the international community engaged
in the war on terror.
It appears that there is a rock of truth in the pronouncement as
substantial amount of foreign exchange has found its way into
their hands. It is the cash deliveries that have
opportunistically united the same individuals who have recently
fought against each other and that have supported different
factions of the TFG.
The Alliance initiated their first attack on the Islamic Courts
in late February and this engagement led to the murder of nearly
several dozen innocent victims in addition to death of scores of
militia gunmen. Contrary to their public claims the alliance has
suffered a major setback during this first assault and they have
been regrouping to reverse their defeat. They have rejected the
mediation efforts by all intermediaries of goodwill and the
slaughter of the innocent is on again.
Meanwhile, two of the three most seniors “leaders” of the TFG
have uttered either contradictory statements –in support of or
against the warlords – or irresponsibly suggested to the two
sides to go to the outskirts of the city and fight it out. It is
as if the latter is eager to see this tussle go to the finish
since that will weaken two of his strongest opponents in
Mogadishu regardless of the human cost.[1]
The people of Mogadishu are scurrying for refuge as another
nasty conflagration has begun. Several hundred innocent people
(including many children) have been killed and thousands of
indigents are displaced. This atrocity will fortify the cage the
population has been in for over a decade while the international
community seems least moved by the unfolding disaster and the
internment of an entire people.
The plight of the Somali people is tantamount to a life in
terrorist camp. In spite of the absence of a commonly accepted
international definition of terrorism, I offer the following:
terrorism is cruelty against civilians with the intention of
causing fear in order for the perpetrators to maintain
illegitimately gotten gains, including political power.
As the recent BBC[2] panel on the subject noted state and
non-state actors can commit terrorist acts. This definition
succinctly portrays the abominable activities the warlords have
been engaged in for over a decade. The costs of warlords
terrorism, as we noted earlier, have been the death of hundreds
of thousands of people, young and old, and two to three million
others who exist under some of the most inhumane conditions in
the world. In addition, millions of children’s lives have been
stunted and condemned to a blighted future.
IV. What is Next? No More Terrorism!
In spite of the stereotype that Somalis are violent people, the
vast majority of the population has not been involved in the
endless civil war except in self-defense. In fact, their
reluctance to proactively challenge the merchants of violence is
partly why the warlords’ tyranny has endured this long. The
public has been willing, for the sake of “peace,” to forgive
their tormentor and accept whatever they demanded, including a
claim to the mantle of national leadership.[3] But it has become
apparent that the warlords are not interested in turning the
page and embrace the rule of law. This is the etiology of terror
in Somalia.
The interplay between several factors prolongs Somalia’s agony.
First, the apparent disorganization of civic minded Somalis and
their not daring to challenge the warlords is a major obstacle
to change. Second, the Ethiopian government which is opposed to
Somali unity and independence (see the long record since the
1940s) has attempted to impose its agenda on the Somali people
through it Trojan warlord horses.
Having failed to do so, it stokes the forces of violence and
social fragmentation. Third, the international community’s
lackadaisical attitude has not been robust enough to help
Somalis help themselves by establishing a national government
that will serve them as well as honor its international
obligations. These conditions have created a milieu that serves
neither Somalis nor the international community and which
therefore is not tenable.
What then must be done?
Several things must occur in a graduated sequence in order to
transform circumstances that reward terror and restore civilized
norms to Somalia.
First, international actors who support some of the warlords as
allies against terrorism must accept responsibility for the
massacre of hundreds of innocent people and the thousands
displaced, and urgently redirect their involvement in support of
the civics and the ailing TFG. To paraphrase the words of
Somalia’s most immanent democrat, those who support the warlords
must recognize that they are involved in a “devil’s pact.”
Second, concerned Somalis can no longer be spectators waiting
for someone else to salvage their domain. Instead, they must
come to the fore and form a broad based civic organization whose
purpose is to help form a national government dedicated to
democracy and accountability. Given the poverty of resources in
the country and the dangers involved in challenging domestic
terrorists, the international community -for reasons of self
interest- should support this movement materially and
diplomatically.
Further, it should treat local and international terrorist alike
and seriously warn the warlords to cease their heinous activity
and disband their militias. Such stance will galvanize the
majority of the population and rekindle the nationalist project
– the key to the creation of a sane political order.
Third, those involved in the Shariica courts must understand
that the only way for a cultured Islamic nation to reemerge is
through the rule of law. As the country’s nationalist poet
laureate forewarned nearly four decades ago:
Darajada Ilaahay ninkii doonaya hele / Those who toil for
Allah’s blessings are rewarded
Nin ka duday distoorkiyo waxyiga diinti ka carrowye / Those who
stray from the constitution and the divine revelations are
outcasts
Dugsi male qabyaaled waxay dumiso mooyaane / Clanist politics
provide no solace, it only destroys
Hadaydaan xumaanta iyo dilkiyo daynin kala qaadka / If we do not
terminate this savagery and mend our ways
Dibaddan ka joogna sharciga daacada Illaahe / We are beyond
Allah’s grace
Danbarkeygu waa jahanama iyo dobobki naareede / Its reward is
jahanama, the cruelest purgatory of all
Abdillahi Sultan Timacadde, 1968
Timacadde’s prophetic words enunciated the close affinity
between the divine and constitutional accountability. Those in
the Islamic courts need to understand that without
constitutional accountability Somalis risk losing their
cherished faith. Thus, if they are keen for Islam flourishing in
this land, then they must distinguish themselves by laboring for
such a salvation.
Abdi Ismail Samatar
:- Is Professor, geography and global studies at the University
of Minnesota and can be reached at: E-maill:
samat001@umn.edu
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