OPINION

Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in late December 2006, which was given logistical and intelligence support by the United States, had eliminated the T.F.G.'s organized political opposition, the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.), which had sought to unify Somalia through establishing an Islamic state based on Shari'a law. The defeat of the I.C.C., which had succeeded in gaining control over most of Somalia south of the breakaway sub-state of Puntland, opened a new chapter in Somalia's political history that is framed by the central drama of whether or not the T.F.G. will be able to become the country's first functioning government after 15 years of de facto statelessness.

Formed under the pressure of Western donor powers and the United Nations in Kenya in 2004, the T.F.G. was, from its outset, lacking in broad legitimacy and starved for resources, and remained in Kenya until 2006, when its contending factions agreed to move to the town of Baidoa in south-central Somalia. Opposition of local warlords and later of the I.C.C. to the T.F.G. in Somalia's official capital Mogadishu prevented the T.F.G. from installing itself there.

The defeat of the I.C.C. threw Somalia back to the political situation that existed prior to the rise of the Courts movement in June 2006, in which a would-be central government that was weak and unpopular confronted assorted regional and local powers rooted in the country's clan structure, now with the addition of an Islamist-nationalist insurgency. The T.F.G. was able, under the protection of Ethiopian forces, to transfer itself partially to Mogadishu, but it was dependent for its foothold on the presence of its protectors and has thus far been unable to govern.

The dependence of the T.F.G. on Somalia's traditional regional rival Ethiopia has weakened its legitimacy further and has provided added impetus to opposition to it. Addis Ababa is aware that the presence of its forces triggers a backlash and has already withdrawn one-third of its troops from Somalia. Having achieved its objective of eliminating the immediate threat of an Islamic state on its eastern border, Ethiopia is content to leave Somalia -- as journalist Gwynne Dyer puts it -- "crippled." As it loses protection, the T.F.G. is placed at the mercy of Western donor powers and the United Nations, which are eager to see Somalia stabilized -- it is their agenda to which the T.F.G. is constrained to respond.

The challenges posed to the T.F.G. by the United States, European powers operating through the European Union, and the United Nations are centered on demands that the T.F.G. bring security to Somalia and that it undertake an "inclusive" reconciliation process that incorporates the major social forces in the country into a governmental structure. According to the reasoning of the external actors, security and reconciliation are inextricably bound together -- instability will continue as long as reconciliation does not proceed, and reconciliation cannot proceed unless there is military security. The external actors solve the conundrum in theory by demanding that both objectives be pursued simultaneously by the T.F.G.

Fully cognizant that the T.F.G. cannot presently secure Somalia, the external actors support an African Union (A.U.) "stabilization mission" to replace the Ethiopians that has begun to deploy in Mogadishu. Aware that the stabilization mission -- AMISOM -- will face a backlash from Somalis unless there is progress toward reconciliation, the external actors put pressure on the T.F.G. to hold a national conference that would be directed toward seeking a power-sharing agreement.

The T.F.G. welcomes the presence of AMISOM and is reluctant to pursue power-sharing, which would erode the power of its present officials and deprive some of them of their positions and perquisites. The opposition forces understand the T.F.G.'s military vulnerability and are insistent on power-sharing, creating a sharply configured, albeit complex conflict.

In March, it became clear that the test of strength for the T.F.G. would be centered in Mogadishu. With the T.F.G. having announced that it would hold a reconciliation conference there in mid-April, its prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, admitted at a press conference in Nairobi on March 14 that "the security issue in the next two weeks will be a test for us." At that press conference, which Gedi called to appeal publicly for donor aid to provide a secure environment for the reconciliation conference, he also said that donor countries had yet to provide funds for training T.F.G. security forces.

Armed Opposition Escalates

Neither on the ground nor in the negotiating chambers does the T.F.G. give cause to believe that it will be able to meet the challenges posed by the donor powers. Indeed, through the end of February and into March, the T.F.G.'s position has weakened, despite the deployment of 1,200 AMISOM peacekeepers from Uganda.

For the past three weeks, Mogadishu has been the scene of persistent violence, including mortar and rocket attacks on T.F.G. and Ethiopian installations, and the city's airport and seaport; machine gun attacks on police stations and checkpoints; targeted assassinations of public officials and their relatives; unexplained homicides; intra-clan gun fights; car jackings; and the erection of road blocks by local militias to extort tolls from motorists.

The most significant component of the escalating violence is the presence of an insurgency against the T.F.G., Ethiopian occupiers and the AMISOM forces, which have also been attacked. Although most of the incidents have not been claimed by any group, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (P.R.M.) -- the reorganized militant wing of the I.C.C. -- has taken credit for some of them. A new insurgent movement -- the Popular Defense Army, composed of Somali army veterans -- announced its formation, stating: "We see that three enemies have made an alliance in humiliating our reputation and religion, and they are America, Ethiopia and Kenya."

Local media report that other contributors to the violence are regrouped militias of the warlords who ruled Mogadishu before the rise of the I.C.C. and of disaffected businessmen. On February 23, the Somaljecel website reported that warlords Mohamed Dheere, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah and Abdi Nur Siyed had formed a covert alliance and were buying weapons. The new coalition, which recalls the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism that had fought the I.C.C. in the "battle of Mogadishu" in 2006, is motivated by its members' perceived marginalization from the T.F.G., after they had acquiesced in disarmament. On March 3, in an interview with Garowe Online, the commander of the T.F.G.'s second brigade in Mogadishu, Ibrahim Abdi Adan, attributed some of the attacks on the city's seaport to the owners of El Maan natural harbor, which had lost business since the transfer of shipping to the main port.

The T.F.G. has responded to the insurgency and civil disorder by alternately placing its forces in the streets and withdrawing them. The Ethiopians, who have attempted to keep a low profile, have often responded to attacks on their installations by returning fire with heavy artillery, causing civilian casualties and inciting greater anger against their presence. Joint T.F.G.-Ethiopian operations have undertaken sporadic searches of houses and vehicles, and there have been reports of abductions of opposition and religious figures by the government.

During the first week of March, the AMISOM deployment began and, during the second week of March, the T.F.G. announced that it was deploying 4,000 newly-trained forces on the streets and would proceed to secure Mogadishu and disarm its population. The many previous declarations by the T.F.G. that it was on the verge of establishing order have not proven to be true, and this one is unlikely to be an exception.

As the violence escalated in Mogadishu, people began to flee the city in large numbers; on March 14, the United Nations reported that 40,000 people had left Mogadishu since mid-February. Local media reported that some of them had returned, preferring to face the possibility of death and injury to the miserable conditions and hostility that they had experienced in the regions to which they had relocated.

With the T.F.G. having staked its future on control of Mogadishu, the rest of Somalia drifted back to local clan control or the absence of authority. Conditions were particularly unstable in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, and the Lower Jubba region, which includes the strategic port city of Kismayo.

Local media reported an absence of government in Middle and Lower Shabelle. In Middle Shabelle, local media reported that militias loyal to its former warlord Mohamed Dheere had prevented the new T.F.G.-sanctioned administration from taking control, leading businessmen to support Dheere's forces in order to stem a crime wave. Dheere claimed that the new administration had never come to the region and that he had been left "alone." In Lower Shabelle, there were reports of a proliferation of roadblocks extorting tolls from motorists, leading to suspensions of transportation between that region and Mogadishu.

In Lower Jubba, local clans pledged resistance if the new T.F.G.-backed administration attempted to levy taxes. In the first reported development of its kind, the Somali website Ruuknet reported on March 15 that insurgents backed by the I.C.C. and local clans had seized the region's Badhaadhe district after they had ascertained that Ethiopian forces had withdrawn. Clan militias were reported to have closed a key road out of Kismayo, leading to the imposition of a state of "high alert" in the city and a mobilization of militias from Puntland who were protecting its administration. On March 18, Col. Abdi Mohamed Abdulle, the commander of the police force in Kismayo, was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, who escaped in a waiting pickup truck.

The above sketch of the situation that the T.F.G. faces on the ground shows that the transitional authorities are failing to create a secure environment and are confronted with a multi-dimensional armed opposition that is growing and deepening.

The AMISOM mission, which was envisioned by donor powers to have 8,000 troops, only has the Ugandan battalion on the ground and pledges of a battalion from Burundi and half a battalion from Nigeria, which are scheduled to arrive in mid-April, bringing the projected total number of forces to 4,000. In any case, AMISOM's mission is limited to protecting infrastructure and the transitional institutions, and providing security for the reconciliation process and humanitarian aid deliveries, and excludes engaging in conflict with opposition factions or disarming them.

Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, announced on March 13 that the remaining two-thirds of its occupying forces would withdraw in two phases, as AMISOM replaces them and the reconciliation process "quiets things down." How quickly the withdrawal will occur is uncertain; on March 15, after having met for two days with the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Ethiopia's foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, announced that Addis Ababa would help the T.F.G. until it gained control "across Somalia." Were the Ethiopian occupiers to remain in Somalia for an extended period of time, AMISOM would become identified with them and would have its already low level of credibility further weakened.

With an under-funded and under-forced AMISOM as an inadequate replacement for Ethiopian protection, the T.F.G. is unlikely to be able to secure Mogadishu, much less the rest of Somalia, unless it is able to mount a credible reconciliation process.

Reconciliation dispute:

Although they coat their position with a rhetoric of promise that the T.F.G. can reconcile Somalia, all of the external actors share PINR's reading of the security situation and are aware of the T.F.G.'s tenuous grasp on authority and its dearth of power. They share a consensus that unless the T.F.G. executive -- controlled by Yusuf and Gedi uneasily amid factional divides -- decides to make sacrifices and bring the various factions on Somalia's political landscape, except for hard-line Islamic revolutionaries, into a genuine power-sharing compact, the country will sink deeper into its devolutionary cycle. They have, therefore, placed pressure on the T.F.G. to initiate "inclusive" reconciliation talks aimed at genuine power-sharing.

The T.F.G. executive has attempted to deflect external pressure by initiating an alternative reconciliation process that is geared to preserving its present structure and personnel. For the external actors and Somalia's domestic opposition, reconciliation means negotiations with political opponents of the T.F.G., including conciliatory elements of the I.C.C., and religious leaders, as well as clan representatives; for the T.F.G. executive, reconciliation means clan representatives discussing -- as Gedi put it in his March 14 press conference -- "dispute settlement" and amnesty for those who had taken up arms against the T.F.G.

On March 1, Yusuf announced that a reconciliation conference had been planned for mid-April that would bring together 3,000 participants from throughout the country and the Somalia diaspora, and would last for two months. The basis of the talks would be "reconciliation among clans," which would leave unquestioned the T.F.G.'s clan-based constitution and would not allow the political opposition to negotiate in an organized manner, severely diminishing the prospect of power-sharing. On March 11, the T.F.G.'s ministry of reconciliation sent a committee into the various regions of Somalia to nominate delegates to the conference.

The T.F.G.'s alternative "Somali" approach to reconciliation met with immediate rejection from the opposition. Most importantly, major elements of the powerful Hawiye clan family, which had been marginalized in the T.F.G. and had provided key support for the I.C.C. and was its base, held a meeting and issued a statement condemning the T.F.G. for inviting Ethiopian troops into Somalia, declaring a state of emergency, infringing on the transitional constitution's formula for clan representation and making illegal appointments, and proposing a reconciliation conference that is "not open." The statement went on to urge the T.F.G. to hold an open reconciliation conference, including the I.C.C. as a political entity, and to request that the "international community" effect the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and organize a "real national reconciliation meeting" based on political representation in a "neutral place." The statement concluded by warning the international community to be cautious about supporting a "tyrannous government."

The I.C.C. also responded to the T.F.G.'s reconciliation project with its moderate wing -- based in Yemen and led by former I.C.C. executive council chair, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed -- expressing willingness to negotiate, but only as political equals. On March 1, the I.C.C. issued an official statement -- its first since the Ethiopian invasion -- from Sana'a, urging resistance against the occupiers, apologizing for its past "mistakes" and calling for a reconciliation process that would include all sectors of Somali society in the political process, especially intellectuals, experts, traditional elders, members of civil society and civil servants.

The militant wing of the I.C.C., led by Adan Hashi Ayro, who commands the al-Shabaab militia, released a tape in which Ayro declared that he would continue to fight troops who are the "enemies of Islam," and called for jihad against the foreign occupation, including AMISOM. He said that Islamist forces are "scattered throughout Somalia," especially in the large cities.

International and local media reported that al-Shabaab is intact and is organized in a secure cellular structure, and that Hawiye elders are quietly reconstituting small militias. On March 3, U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Somalia, Eric Laroche, said that I.C.C. leaders had told him that they had retreated, but "are going to come back," adding that "without demobilizing fighters, having a police force is nothing."

On March 8, the United Nations released a report warning of "renewed and prolonged insecurity" if the T.F.G. was unable to "consolidate authority," noting the reappearance of the warlords, urging "inclusive dialogue," and appealing to the international community to assist AMISOM.

With the T.F.G.'s will to participate in an open dialogue in doubt, the external actors -- now concentrated in the U.N. Security Council -- issued a resolution on March 14 condemning the violence in Somalia and attacks on the AMISOM peacekeepers in particular, urging rapid deployment of pledged peacekeepers and support for AMISOM from donors, and calling on the T.F.G. to continue to "work on a representative and inclusive political process," including religious leaders and political organizations.

In line with the Security Council's action, the major external actors have remained, at least publicly, on the sidelines, reiterating their consensus rhetorically, but apparently lacking the will to attempt to impose it on the T.F.G. They have not shown any intention of trying to organize an open reconciliation conference on neutral ground, or to try to broker reconciliation, leaving the T.F.G. to pursue its clan-based approach. For the moment, the T.F.G. seems to have finessed the external actors, allowing it to benefit from AMISOM without having to alter its structure and personnel.

Conclusion

Given the consistent assessment of external actors -- and also of analysts -- that the T.F.G. cannot succeed unless it institutes a political rather than a social process of reconciliation, Yusuf's finesse brings short-term gains to the presently constituted T.F.G., and the likelihood of continued devolution and fragmentation to Somalia, along with an Islamist insurgency.

The donor powers backing the T.F.G. face a dilemma: if they press the T.F.G. into open reconciliation talks, they risk its implosion; if they stand back and let Yusuf proceed with his social approach to reconciliation, they risk increasing instability as devolution progresses. It is this unpleasant choice that drives them to the sidelines and convinces them -- for the moment -- to let Yusuf proceed; just as the T.F.G. is bound to the donor powers, the donor powers have tethered themselves to the T.F.G.

The success of the T.F.G.'s approach to reconciliation is highly unlikely to succeed. It is unclear whether all of the significant sectors of Somali society will attend the conference, and it is only a power-sharing agreement and a restructuring of the T.F.G. that has any chance of resolving Somalia's conflicts.

Expect the reversion to fragmentation in Somalia to continue, as the T.F.G. is allowed to proceed with its brand of reconciliation. The T.F.G. is the weak protagonist in a drama beyond its control.