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It
is 30 years since June 1977 and a nostalgic
flashback to that period may sound such a long
time ago for many Somalis. Given the life
expectancy of an ordinary Somali is less than 40
years, one might expect less than half of the
present Somali population to have been around at
that year or to be old enough at the time. All
the same, that year was such an epoch-making one
that it has permanently entered into the Somali
folklore. Somalis, young or old, now remember it
as the time when the mighty Somali army of that
era had finally accomplished its long awaited
mission and in a matter of one month or two
crushed the Ethiopian-army and liberated its
administered Somali territory, better known
internationally as the Ogaden, a name detested
by Ethiopia for good historical reasons and
resented by some Somalis for its apparent clan
connotations..
The Somali- Ethiopian war over the Ogaden in the
summer of 1977, as it came to be known, was not
confined to those two antagonists. If it was,
Ethiopia would have for ever lost the territory
and that would have been the end of the story.
Sadly for Somalia and Somalis everywhere, big
powers intervened mainly on the side of
Ethiopia. The former USSR, hitherto Somalia’s
protégé, had to choose between two
irreconcilable client states and, having failed
to dissuade Somalia from its military intentions
or actions, decided for its own geopolitical and
strategic interests to ditch Somalia and back
Ethiopia to the hilt militarily, economically
and diplomatically.
On the other hand, the USA initially wooed
Somalia with promises of economic assistance and
military aid for self defence. Having lost
Ethiopia, then under its Marxist leader,
Mengestu Haile Marian, to the Russians, the USA
main interest in Somalia was to wrest it from
the USSR and hopefully gain a military foothold
in order to contain the expanding Soviet
dominance straddling South Yemen on the Arabian
side of the Red Sea and the strategic Horn of
Africa.
Real politic being what it is, the Americans in
no time reversed their position on the military
assistance once it became clear that it was the
Somali national army which was doing all the
fighting in the territory and not the militia of
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) as
Somalia had all along claimed despite all the
incontestable evidence on the ground. Not only
did the USA went back on their promise of
military assistance, but they went further and
sponsored through the UN Security Council an
arms embargo against Somalia that was binding so
long as its forces were in the terrotory.
It was this embargo, more than anything else,
and the shipment of billions of dollars worth of
Soviet arms s to Ethiopia, together with over
40,000 Cuban soldiers, that overwhelmingly
tipped the balance of power in Ethiopia’s favour.
That reality persuaded Siyad Barre to cut his
losses and withdraw his army from the Ogaden or
face a certain defeat entailing incalculable
consequences.
Some Westerners refer to the outcome of the war
as a victory for Ethiopia and a defeat for
Somalia. It was certainly a political defeat for
Somalia to the extent that it was not able to
hold on to the territory in the face of the
overwhelming military odds it faced. Ethiopia
did not defeat the Somali army in any battle but
recovered the territory on the back of the
massive military help from USSR and its Cuban
ally, and to the concomitant arms embargo
imposed on Somalia.
My article is concerned mainly with recounting
my own story of those glorious days in Somalia
in June/July of 1977. As it was, I was an
insider to the great drama unfolding in the
Ogaden having been assigned as war correspondent
for the BBC’s Focus on Africa just before my
joining the United Nations in Geneva late 1977.
In this article, I will relate my memorable
observations from the war front as we followed
the breathtaking sweep of the Somali army over
the vast territory. Mogadishu and its glory in
June 1977 is the point of departure for this
story. Good stories have a happier ending but
this one sadly ends with the gloom and doom
engulfing Mogadishu in June 2007. It is this
twist and turns of fortunes in the two periods
that is the essence of the story
Mogadishu where it all started
My first ever visit to Mogadishu was in July
1967, then a relatively small sleepy town. That
was the time when President Aden Abdalla Osman
and his Prime Minister Abdirazaak Haji Hussein
were replaced by President Abdirashiid Ali
Sharmake and Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.
When I returned to Mogadishu for my second visit
in June 1977 after ten years absence, I flew in
for the first time with the newly established
Somali Airline whose enchanting atmosphere and
typically Somali bonhomie could not had been a
better way for my homecoming. What struck me
immediately on arrival in Mogadishu was the
staggering change that took place during my
absence. Not only has the capital expanded
beyond recognition, but it was the social and
infrastructural development, the national
cohesion, the vibrant confidence and the
nationalistic fervour exuding from everywhere
that gripped my attention and those of the
swarms of foreign media reporters who were
descending on Mogadishu like me to report on the
war.
They chose to cover the war from the Somali side
rather than from Addis Ababa knowing that the
winning side would be only too eager to take
them to the battle zones in the Ogaden. A losing
side of course would hardly be keen to permit
its humiliating defeat be paraded in the
international public arena. This intoxicating
atmosphere in Mogadishu was only a foretaste of
what I were later to experience as we set off to
Godey, the crown jewel of Ethiopia’s military
outposts in the territory.
Off to the Ogaden
I was among the first group of journalists to be
invited in June 1977 to visit “the first
“liberated” areas. Godey, captured only a week
or two earlier by the “WSLF” as Somalia claimed,
was our main interest. Our convoy consisted of 6
Land Rovers carrying nearly a dozen radio, press
and T.V crew. In my car, which was the lead car,
we had a middle aged American lady, Newsweek’s
Chief bureau in Paris, an Italian journalist,
one armed “WSLF” body guard (in reality a
colonel from the Somali army) and a public
relations official from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
As we crossed the Somali border, and before
reaching Fer Fer, we came across the first
visible casualty of the war: an overturned T-34
tank. It was unmistakably a Somali one as it
carried the familiar Somali insignia. Since
Somalia did not invade the terrotpry, as it was
claiming, its tanks would not logically be
there.
All the same, it was difficult to understand how
it came to its undignified end. Perhaps the old
banger might have hit a ditch in the rush to get
to Fer Fer and Mustaxiil. Whatever the cause of
the tank’s overturning, no one has prepared us
for this surprise.. Naturally, we the Somalis in
the car pretended not to have seen it. But it
was a sight that was not going to escape the
attention of the watchful, eagle-eyed American
lady .She asked our car to be stopped and with
one closer look at the object screamed:”
what is this? It is a Somali tank!!”
Facing this first crisis, we remained speechless
except for the man from the
Foreign Office. He was given a stern brief from
his Minister before departure from Mogadishu to
deny at all costs Somalia’s military
intervention. Having no choice under the
circumstances, his incredulous, knee-jerk
response only made the situation worse as he
officiously yelled: “No, it is not a
tank, it is a tractor!!”
If the spectacle of the deserted tank was
ignored by the rest of the accompanying press as
a mere sideline distraction, it represented for
the American lady reporter the perfect evidence
she was looking for implicating Somalia directly
in the war. Using this episode as the centre
piece of her feature article in Newsweek, and
mocking the Somalis for believing they can
outwit the rest of the world, or pull wool over
their eyes, she was the first journalist to
report first hand evidence of Somalia’s military
intervention. Be that as it may, her article was
otherwise a damning critique of Ethiopia’s
barbaric occupation and colonisation of the
territory.
Face to face with the realities of
Ethiopia’s rule
Wherever we stopped in this trip, at Fer Fer,
Mustaxiil, Qalaafo and Godey, people turned out
in their thousands, revelling in their newly won
freedom and deafeningly venting their long
pent-up hatred of their Ethiopian tormenters.
Such public outpourings, and the overall
realities on the ground that we witnessed here
-and in other towns in the Ogaden that we were
to visit in subsequent trips- have collectively
conveyed a clear message to the visiting media
about the true colonial nature of Ethiopia’s
presence in the territory and the desire of its
people for freedom and for unity with their
brethren in Somalia. Almost without exception,
that was a message that resonated well with the
foreign media, judging by their unmistakable
empathy and their supportive coverage.
Looking around those towns, a striking feature
of the Ethiopian military garrisons in the
territory was their locations. Invariably, these
were located for defensive purposes on higher
grounds or hilltops and at a safe distance from
towns or other human settlements. Such defences
were clearly not against a possible invading
foreign army but against the local people. These
are the hallmarks of an occupying army among
hostile occupied populations.
The scatter of destroyed tanks, artillery
pieces, burn-out military vehicles and countless
unidentifiable debris; and of course captured
Ethiopian prisoners, including women and
children whose men left them behind in their
rush to escape for their lives, were all that
reminded us of the presence of the Ethiopians at
these garrisons The rout of the Ethiopian army
at every garrison we visited in this trip was
inescapable and everywhere.
While the military aspects were journalistically
newsworthy, no less eye-catching was the
heart-rending backwardness and misery under
which the people in the territory had been kept.
Ethiopia has always claimed that the Somalis in
the Ogaden were Ethiopians enjoying the same
right as other Ethiopians in the country. But
the realities on the ground were so different.
In none of the towns we visited did we find the
minimum basic social services or economic
development: Not a single school, hospital, or
roads worth mentioning.
Rather than being recipients of development, the
Somalis in the territory were often easy prey to
unpaid or ill-paid marauding Ethiopian soldiers
for whom feeding on the locals, or raping their
women at will, was part of a long-established
Ethiopian colonial practices in the distant
parts of its Empire. But they even fared far
worse than others, paying the price of the
century-old, deep-seated hostility between
Somalis and Ethiopia. Somalia’s independence in
1960 and the quest for the liberation of other
Somali territories had added to the
ill-treatment of the Somalis under Ethiopia
rule. The harsh colonial realities we observed
in this first trip were to be found in all the
other places we visited in subsequent trips
If one was to rank Ethiopia’s defeat among all
the places we were taken to in all the trips,
the capture of Jigjiga stands out, in my
non-military judgement as the biggest loss of
the Ethiopian army. The plains of the area all
the way to Kaaraa Mardha were littered with dead
Ethiopians and destroyed tanks. As we got closer
to the mountains, we could hear the terrifying
artillery noise perhaps close to the Town of
Harar, the ultimate objective of the Somali army
but which they never managed to capture as the
onerous arms embargo imposed on Somalia began to
deplete the fire power of the Somali army
Once the occupying Ethiopian forces were chased
out from everywhere, apart from Harar and Dirir
Dhawa, and given the absence of any lingering
bonds with the territory, ethnically,
linguistically, culturally and economically,
there was nothing left to show that the area has
ever been part of Ethiopia except for the
physical colonial scars and the relics their
army left behind. The media reports and their
revelations exposing the true colonial nature of
the relations between Addis Ababa and the Ogaden
were no less bitter for Ethiopia as the military
defeats themselves.
International relations weaknesses
The downside of Somalia’s stunning military
successes was its weak international public
relations. Many in the West, particularly in
Europe, were sympathetic to Somalia’s historical
claim to the territory, having been the ones
responsible in the first place for the
partitioning of the Somali homeland among
themselves and Ethiopia. After all, it was a
former British Foregin Minister who after the
second World War called for the unity of the
four Somali territories under British control:
British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, the
Ogaden and the NFD.
But whatever sympathy Somalia enjoyed, it did
not extend to militarily invading its neighbour,
though it would have been a totally different
story if it was the much vaunted WSLF which were
truly waging the liberation struggle. To counter
diplomatic isolation, and the crippling arms
embargo, it was all the more important for
Somalia to have robust international public
relations.
As it was, Somalia’s neglected international
relations with the West were its Achilles hill.
The country was emerging from years of
self-imposed isolation where contact with
Westerners could only be conducted at the
official level but not otherwise permitted.
Though the government was beginning to
understand the value of getting its cause across
to western opinion makers, it was hesitant to
ease its repressive communist style restrictions
on free speech and assembly lest they lose their
tight grip on the population. In the early
months of the war, it was two steps forward, one
step back.
The charismatic Omar Arteh Qalib, who was the
foreign Minister until the beginning the war,
was suddenly dropped at a time when he was
needed most perhaps because he was becoming too
popular and effective for his own good. The post
remained vacant during the first critical months
of the war and was finally given to Abdurahman
Jama Barre, a lacklustre, ineffectual brother of
President Mohamed Siyad Barre.
The weaknesses of the Foreign Ministry would
have mattered less if the WSLF- the principal
organisation purported to be waging the war- was
itself an effective functioning body. It was
nothing more than a dummy and a tool serving
government propaganda. Its leaders were
frequently changed at the behest of President
Mohamed Siyad Barre. Under the circumstances,
there was no coherent explicit WSLF policy on
the territorial extent of the Somali inhabited
territory they were claiming to be liberating.
The leader of the WSLF at the time would often
inform foreign reporters that their territory
extended all the way to the town of Nasret - not
that much far from Addis Ababa- and that it
included large chunks of Sidamo and Bale regions
whose Oromo inhabitants were referred to as
Somali Abow much to their chagrin. His wild,
preposterous claims should be seen in the
context of the prevailing euphoria of those days
when Somalis everywhere were intoxicated with
the military successes of their army,
engendering a free for all claims among
ministers, high-level government officials and
the public at large. Such claims did not win
much kudos with the visiting reporters and did
no good to the liberation cause. A good foreign
minister, if Somalia had one at the time, would
have counselled against such damaging excesses
and would have evolved a common reference
position for the guidance of all concerned.
Press Reports on the War
Somalia’s military intervention had both
negative and positive consequences. On the
negative side, an arms embargo was imposed which
ultimately forced it to withdraw from the
territory. On the positive side, however, was
the worldwide awakening to the continued
Ethiopian colonisation of the territory and the
support it engendered for the yearning of the
Somalis under its rule for self-determination
and freedom. That positive achievement has not
come about through any successful diplomatic
campaign by Somalia but thanks to the foreign
media who witnessed the realities of that
colonisation and conveyed it to the outside
world.
Unlike the Security Council’s amentable focus on
legal technicalities, for the media, Somalia’s
violation of the UN Charter was less important
than Ethiopia’s occupation of the Somali
territory and its denial of the right of its
people to self determination. If there was any
reservation on their part, it was against the
expansionist tendencies of the Somalis to claim
at times non Somali-inhabited areas that
everybody else saw as Ethiopia proper.
It is worthwhile mentioning that for good
historical reasons, the reporters of those days
during the war, and those after them to the
present day have invariably referred to the
territory as the Ogaden. Look at any map of
Ethiopia not issued by that government (see the
one above from Google) and the Ogaden name is
the one most prominently displayed. This is for
good reasons. First because that is the name
that the territory came to be known
internationally when European and Ethiopian
colonisers curved up the Somali homeland in the
late 19th century and gave that particular area
to Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia. But the region
came to acquire much international prominence
during the World Wars when Italy used it as a
conduit for its invasion of Abyssinia. Since
then, Somalia’s independence in 1960 and the
quest for Greater Somalia had once again put the
spot light on the territory as its people began
to struggle for their freedom.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia had their own
different reasons for their phobia against the
Ogaden name. Losing sight of the wider picture,
Somalis are allergic to it since it smacks of
the clan by the same name and wrongly consider
it as tantamount to the denial of other clans in
the region, most of whom are late comers
including my own. For Ethiopia, it kept alive
unfavourable history and, in its desperate and
vain effort to prevail over that history, had
given the territory various names at different
times. Hararghe was the official name for
territory during the 1977 war. But much to its
consternation, the foreign reporters would have
none of it, preferring instead the region’s
historical name to fake ones. In this article, I
had followed that line. If the Somalis were to
overlook their myopic, clan obsession, the
Ogaden name much serves their national interest
in their contest with Ethiopia over the
territory.
Meeting the old warrior
Meeting President Mohamed Siyad Barreh after
return from field visits to the war zones was
much sought by the foreign press as a fitting
finale to their assignment. You can say what you
like about him but you have to give the devil
his due There he was, the old warrior, at these
special press meetings, chain smoking, and
oozing presidential pride, charisma, confidence
and nationalism that Somalia has not seen
anything like it since him. He personified more
than anyone else the mood and confidence of
Somalia at the time. His English may have been
poor, but he always managed to communicate his
message. No one has impressed the foreign press
more than him.
Mogadishu June 2007
Mogadishu’s descent from its thousand years long
glory has started with the fall of the Somali
state from when it remained in the hands of
rapacious and egregious warlords for 15 years .
They had inflicted incalculable damage on that
once beautiful capital. But that has been
totally eclipsed by its occupation and
destruction by Ethiopia in 2007 in cahoots with
its Somali collaborators. By what can only be
described as wanton indiscriminate vengeance,
Ethiopia razed large parts of the city to the
ground and forced a third of its population to
flee for their lives into the inhospitable
countryside facing hunger, disease and exposure
to the vagaries of the weather. Those actions
would go down in the annals of Somalia’s history
as its darkest days.
Meles Zenewi, the monster Somalia reared and
pampered to bring down Mengestu Haile Marian and
the Ethiopian Empire, has instead turned on his
former host country with ungrateful venom and
vengeance. It is a measure of his amazing feat
how he succeeded to turn Somalia into a vassal
state under Ethiopia’s hegemony thanks in no
small measure to the support from his Somali
cohorts. Under him, an old Ethiopian dream has
come true and Somalis have only themselves to
blame.
Mogadishu was Somalia’s mini Mecca. And nothing
could be more humiliating than when Ethiopian
soldiers desecrate the honour of our sacred
capital by their mere presence, occupy former
bases and posts that were once the nation’s
pride, and commit heinous crimes against its
occupied people. There could not be anything
more insulting to the memory of the mighty
Somali army of 1977 than the sight of those
ramshackle clan militias masquerading as the
national army and serving as camp followers for
the Ethiopian army. Ethiopia’s writ now runs
everywhere from the Ogaden to Somalia proper.
And Meles Zenewi has installed himself as the de
fact new emperor over the region. The more that
gets to his ego, the more dangerous he will be.
Worse than the Ethiopian occupation are those
Somalis who, for myopic clan interests, support
and justify the occupation. And nothing could be
more insulting to ones intelligence than when
they argue that Ethiopia has been invited, or
that their stay is only for a short period, or
that its actions are for our own common good!!.
What is good about colonising Somalia and
destroying its capital and perpetrating
genocide? It is already six months since the
Ethiopians occupied Mogadishu and their
departure is not in sight.
Those apologists for the Ethiopian occupation
represent the cream of the society and include
elites, former high level government officials
and above all former ambassadors. It is ironic
that some of those ambassadors are the very same
ones who, in the days of Mohamed Siyad Barre,
would ritually denounce Ethiopia at the United
Nations and other forums for its incursions into
Somalia.
I am not aware of what we culturally share with
Ethiopians, but I do know how much we differ
from them. When it comes to loyalty to ones
country, we are poles apart. An Ethiopian may be
anti Mengestu Haile Marian or anti Meles Zenewi
but never against the interest of his country. I
cannot recollect any time during the 1977 war,
or any time since, when any high-level Ethiopian
official ever defected to Somalia and betrayed
his country. In our case, it goes from the top
office holders all the way down. As someone has
said, we are a nation bedevilled with traitors
and turncoats.
Ethiopia, like all other successful invaders
before it, is riding high on its sweet glory.
But as history is a witness to it, there is no
permanency about those successes and ultimately,
all invasions end in disaster. And sooner or
later, the Somali nation will rise from its
moribund state and reassert itself more stronger
than ever before thanks to its bitter experience
over the last 16years and in particular to its
traumatic experience under the Ethiopian
occupation..
A new dawn and glory await Somalia and
hopefully doom for Ethiopia.
When that time comes, Mogadishu will
have the last laugh over Meles Zenewi.